This paper outlines a proposed approach to analyzing the likely causes-of and potential solutions-to two related problems in the administration of the patent system worldwide: the global backlog (or deadlock) in processing patent applications, currently estimated to be at least several million patents currently in the pipeline; and, inconsistent or unreliable quality in the decision-making of patent offices regarding the granting of patents. It does so by presenting a systematic and quantitative approach to analyzing an array of plausible or salient explanations for the two problems and to analyzing an array of alternative solutions to those same problems. The approach advocated herein additionally presents a dynamic approach to analysis of solutions by taking in to account the interdependencies of the alternative strategies. The practical application of the approach is illustrated by employing it in an expert thought experiment. The experiment demonstrates how adopting a systematic and quantitative analytical approach along the lines followed here may reveal a more powerful set of strategy scenarios (each consisting of an array of dynamically related sub-strategies) than has previously emerged in the literature for addressing the twin problems of backlog and unreliable examination quality in the global patent system.
known web-log (blog) in the United States devoted to intellectual property issues provides a typical example of an impassioned but well-informed expression of concern about the issue:
As of the end of Fiscal Year 2008 there are 1,208,076 patent applications still pending at the [US] Patent Office. At the end of Fiscal Year 1997 the number of pending applications left over was only 275,295, so over the last 11 years there has been a 439% increase in the number of pending applications left over that could not be resolved. That is alarming. Each year since 1997 this number has gone up, first going over the 1 million mark in 2006. As patent applications continue to pile up the US patent system is plunging further and further into irrelevance, and that is not a good thing for our economy or for the future of innovation. Something needs to be done immediately to reverse this trend. 13 Similar expressions of concern may be found in Europe:
Increasing globalization and changes in social, political and technological trends have created a surge in the number of applications filed in the world's patent systems. The demand for patents is growing faster than the number of patents processed, creating a backlog of between five to ten million pending applications globally. The escalating pendency of applications is creating uncertainty in the patent system, and casting pressure across the IP landscape, as applicants have to wait up to ten years to see their patents granted. Ciáran McGinley a senior European Patent Office (EPO) official recently described this as 'Global patent warming'. 14 Japan has also been experiencing a similar problem:
For over 30 years, the Japan Patent Office has been known for its slow patent examination, with applicants often waiting around 30 months to receive a first examination letter from the JPO. The Japanese backlog increased substantially from 522 000 in 2003 to 755 000 in 2005. To slow the trend, the JPO has revised some of its procedures and is expanding outsourcing (in 2005, 75 percent of the workload was outsourced). It is also implementing a plan to recruit 500 more examiners over a period of five years. Despite the oft-mentioned problems of patents in general, and the international opposition to patents that has arisen from both academic and political sources, applications from inventors and the owners of inventions have continued apace. There has been a steep world-wide growth in demand for patents during the last decade; and the World's major patent offices have, as a consequence, been stretched to the limits of their capacity. 16 They have also therefore been forced to re-examine the effectiveness of practices and procedures that may have been adequate a few decades ago but which may now need revising.
The second problem that will be addressed by his paper is the widespread perception of uncertain, non-rigorous and irregular quality of patent examination procedures between, and within, those same patent offices. 17 The ensuing uncertainty about the reliability of patents appears to have led to uncomfortably high uncertainty in business and also to financially wasteful legal disputes 18 , not to mention the emergence of emotive web-logs and volatile protests from affected persons closely associated with the patent system.
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Debates about the seriousness and urgency of the problems of questionable patent quality have garnered notable attention from member states of the European Patent 16 This phenomenon has also been described succinctly by Straus, op cit. Global Warming (2008) . 17 , as well as in the Congress of the United States, where the contentious patent reform bill has provided a focal point for expression of concern related to this topic by various stakeholders.
22
The two problems of backlog and quality control in the issuing of patents are often closely linked, both practically and in the minds of concerned stakeholders.
23 Furthermore, as suggested by the following comment by the President of the European Patent Office, Alison Brimelow, the cumulative compound effect of the problems may have become so serious as to confound attempts to find a viable and readily palatable solution:
Huge backlogs change the nature of the patenting system and create ambiguities which can be exploited in ways unforeseen by those who established the patent system. ... I am not clear that we will ever get ourselves back to the position that can be regarded as "healthy balance". I think that the effect of backlogs in the use of intellectual property is probably irreversible, 20 The quality of patents and of patent information more generally has been a prominent theme for discussion recently at the European Patent Office (see, e. Hall et al. (Prospects, Op. cit. (2003) , p. 4) write: "The issuance of low-quality patents also is likely to spur significant increases in patent applications, further straining the already overburdened examination processes of the USPTO. A kind of vicious circle may result, in which cursory examinations of patent applications result in the issue of low-quality patents, which triggers rapid growth in applications, further taxing the limited resources of the USPTO, further limiting the examination of individual applications, and further degrading the quality of patents." and that raises big questions for world patent offices. More generally, there is the theme of quality and fitness-for-purpose of the patent system.
24
With such an assessment of the situation in mind, Brimelow has touted the possibility of radical solutions, such as dramatically reducing the number of patents issued by patent offices and achieving such as reduction by raising the legal threshold of patentability of inventions significantly above that which characterizes the current patent regime.
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A series of analyses, internal projects and inter-office conferences have taken place amongst the world's major patent offices on the theme of this paper, with the major players being the EPO, the JPO, the USPTO and to some extent the WIPO; in addition, other offices such as SIPO, UKIPO, DPMA, and KIPO are increasingly engaged with such issues. Fuggenthaler, Schreiner and Aleker, op cit., Benchmarking Project (2007) . 28 The "Trilateral Cooperation" initiative of the USPTO, the JPO and the EPO (http://www.trilateral.net/) is the most prominent example (see, e.g., http://www.trilateral.net/); however, the patent offices of China and Korea have now entered into cooperation with the Trilateral Cooperation members to form a "group of five" major patent offices collaborating to address the problems of efficiency and reliability in the administration of the global patent system (see Schade, "Synergies," op cit. (2009) [$500,000,000 ], yet pendency and backlog grow worse. As such the Committee has provided bill language to transfer funding to the Office of Inspector General for the express purpose of conducting continual audit engagements and oversight at the USPTO.
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It appears that, in view of the seemingly intractable nature of the problems, members of the Senate are contemplating a less "arms length" approach to the budgetary oversight and management of the USPTO than may previously have been the case.
I conclude this brief introduction with the following observations. A belief that the administration of the global patent system is seriously hampered by the twin problems of a backlog in the processing of patent applications and unreliable quality in the examination and decision-making process for issuing patents is ubiquitous amongst informed observers. A variety of stakeholders in the patent system-ranging from industry representatives, through legal-professional service providers, to social and political activists (and even some employees of the patent organizations themselves)-are speaking out in favor of reform of the patent system, including both its laws and its administration. These perceptions and expressions of concern are international in scope and origin. Furthermore, the respective governments of the world's major patent offices are engaged in debate, with legislative and policy intent, regarding the reform of the patent system to address, among other things, the twin problems that are the subject of this paper. Some of the proposals for reform that have emerged may be perceived by observers as being at least contentious, if not radical, in both concept and likely impact. Finally, the way forward is not clear. In other words, much disagreement exists between various stakeholders as to the exact nature of the problems, the origins and causes of the problems, and the preferred solutions to the problems. The question that is evoked by this situation is how might the respective authorities go about determining the best way to develop a strategy or strategies for reaching an optimal solution to the problems? The rest of this paper will be devoted to answering that question.
Basic Principles for the Proposed Approach to Analyzing the Causes of the Problems and Identifying an Appropriate Mix of Solutions
With so many stakeholders demanding solutions to the patent system's problems as a matter of priority it might be tempting for legislators to quickly embrace one or two of the plausible-sounding ideas for reform that have recently been proposed by commentators and critics. Such ideas might include, for example, radically restricting the number of patents issued by "raising the bar" of the legal requirements for patentability, excluding certain categories of technology from patentability for various "policy" reasons, or making patents less attractive to applicants by reducing the term length of patents to something less than the current norm of 20 years. However, given the immense value of what is at stake in the patent system-technological innovation, the diffusion of technical knowledge, business investment, industry development and economic development-it would seem prudent to devote great care to ensuring that any solution adopted was really likely to be efficacious. In addition, it would be prudent to ensure that costs of imposing such a solution were not greater than its benefits, and that the unintended side-effects of the solution were not likely to be deleterious. How might such prudence be expressed? In this paper I suggest that it would be prudent to follow a systematic and comprehensive strategic-analysis approach that is based on solid and consciously adopted basic principles.
In one sense, such a "systematic and comprehensive strategic-analysis approach" might be seen by many as amounting to nothing more than using common sense. Perhaps.
However, the approach advocated in this paper-whether or not it may be properly described as "common sense"-would require disciplining the imagination through the filters of rigorous, systematic and strategic analysis, taking into account the complementarities and interdependencies of the alternative proposed solutions. Let me begin by laying out the basic principles and assumptions that should underlie such analysis.
1.
The "problem" is actually a compound-problem comprised of a pair of ostensibly distinct problems: the global backlog in the processing of patent applications; and the inconsistent or unreliable quality of the decision-making of patent offices regarding the granting of patents. These two problems are closely intertwined.
2.
There is no one simple explanation for the problems and no singular cause for the problems. There are multiple plausible explanations for the problems. There are also multiple salient explanations for the problems (in the literature and amongst the expressed opinions of interested observers), not all of which are equally plausible, but which deserve at least some consideration as part of a systematic and comprehensive approach.
3.
It is therefore necessary to identify and take in to account the relative cogency of each explanation of the problems.
4.
The optimal solution, or set of solutions, to the problems will depend upon the actual explanations, or causes, of the problems that are identified. Hence, the analysis of solutions ought to be linked to the systematic analysis of plausible or salient explanations of the problems.
5.
Because there is both an array of plausible explanations and an array of potential solutions, we need a manageable way to link arrays of problems and solutions.
6. Some solutions that may appear optimal following a thorough analysis of the plausible explanations of the problems may not actually be very feasible, due to political constraints, powerful vested interests, or other practical constraints that may have no relationship at all with the original causes of the problems. Thus, it will be advisable to evaluate each alternative proposed solution as to its political and practical viability, not just for its operational or logical appeal as a "rational" solution.
7.
Some solutions may work best if they are juxtaposed with other complementary solutions; and some solutions may even be dependent on the implementation of other solutions for their success. Thus, it will be advisable to analyze the interdependency of various proposed solutions.
8. Thus, the "solution" to the compound problems of unacceptable backlog and unreliable examination quality in the administration of the patent system may in fact consist of one or more alternative strategies-each of which, in turn, may be comprised of a configuration of selected solutions. In fact, the preferred strategy might even take the form of a "meta-strategy" comprised of two or more substrategies. There may even be a choice between more than one viable strategy, depending upon the preferences and politics of the authorities and other stakeholders involved in the policy-making process.
9.
The optimal strategy for solving the problems may vary from country to country, depending upon the nature of the forces at work in each jurisdiction.
In conclusion, rather than simply choose some solutions to the backlog and quality problems that seem to be most palatable, in this paper I advocate following a disciplined and structured methodology for identifying one or more alternative strategies for solving the problems. I also advocate that the methodology be based on the above set of nine basic principles.
The balance of the paper will summarize, step by step, what such a methodology might look like. The data provided herein represent the results of a thought experiment to illustrate how the methodology might work, in principle. In other words, they are estimates based on the reasonable judgment of an educated and professionally informed person in the field. Rigorous data will be generated extensively and objectively later during the full-scale implementation of the project, after the conceptual framework and methodology is further refined.
The proposed methodology entails the following six general phases: Each phase consists of several steps and elements. This paper, which contains the outline of a suggested analytical methodology, is the first outcome of the preliminary stage of a proposed full-scale research project devoted to analyzing the twin problems of patent backlog and unreliable quality in the global patent system. During the main stage of the full-scale project the methodology will be refined and the categories and measures will be modified or augmented as appropriate.
Phase One: Identify Plausible or Salient Explanations for the Problems of Backlog and Unreliable Examination Quality in the Global Patent System
The following list is an attempt to lay out the full range of intelligible explanations for the problems in a conceptually simple and non-redundant manner, based on a preliminary assessment of the pertinent literature and on personal professional and academic knowledge.
In other words, it is a conceptual and systematic list rather than an organic synthesis of popularly touted explanations. During the full-scale implementation of the research project, of which this paper is the first result, these categories and descriptions will be justified and elaborated, and perhaps also altered or re-arranged, based upon the results of detailed research.
"Salient" explanations are those explanations that have already been proposed in one form or another in either the pertinent literature or in various policy debates or fora for the discussion of patent issues, regardless of whether or not they are plausible in the light of rigorous analysis. "Plausible" explanations are those explanations for the problems that appear to the current author to be reasonable and potentially convincing to a rational and well-informed analyst in the field, whether or not such explanations have already become salient. Inclusion of an explanation in the list should not thereby be interpreted to mean that it is necessarily persuasive or powerful as a cause of the problems.
Inadequate knowledge in the examiner corps
There is a lack of adequate knowledge and skill related to newer fields of invention, especially those associated with computer software and business methods, but also across all fields of new technology, within the examiner corps of the patent offices.
This lack of expertise leads to slower processing of patent applications and poorer quality decisions by examiners (e.g., due to many "false positive" decisions out of fear of alienating applicants).
Ambiguity and confusion in patent law
There is ambiguity and confusion in the laws of the respective jurisdictions regarding criteria for the patentability of inventions (e.g., whether or not, or under what circumstances, software technology may be patented). This ambiguity confounds the decision making process of examiners.
Inconsistency between the patent laws of major jurisdictions
Inconsistency and incompatibility between the laws of the respective jurisdictions regarding criteria for the patentability of inventions weakens the efficiency and effectiveness of cooperation between patent offices in cases where multiple patent applications are filed across multiple jurisdictions for a single invention.
Financial constraints -government budgets
National governments refuse to allow patent offices a sufficient budget to do their job efficiently and effectively. This may be because national governments see patent offices as "profit centers" and hence would rather extract financial surpluses from the offices than allow the revenue to be channeled back in to improving the quality and efficiency of the offices' work. Alternatively, it may be because national legislatures and executive branches simply do not like the budgets of patent offices to grow very quickly or to appear large compared with other categories of expenditure (even if the patent offices are actually self-funding).
Financial constraints -market preferences
Patent applicants are not willing to pay the amount of money required to cover the true costs of the examination and decision-making process, thereby causing patent offices to charge prices that are suboptimal. This, in effect, means that the "market"
for patent examination services is biased towards low-cost/low-quality services, rather than high-cost/high-quality services.
Financial constraints -civil service rigidities
Civil service regulations and traditions constrain national governments from allowing their respective patent offices to pay patent examiners sufficient remuneration to prevent them from choosing more lucrative patent-related jobs in the private sector.
This financial constraint has the insidious effect of leading to patent examiners being less experienced and of lower quality than their counterparts in the private sector.
Insufficient supply of examiners -demographic constraints
There is an insufficient supply of suitably qualified and eligible people in the world to be recruited and trained by patent offices to meet the demand for patent examiners. In other words, apart from the issue of whether or not patent offices are free to pay adequate remuneration for such examiners, there is simply not enough suitable people available to be recruited.
Political constraints -patent volume
Some national governments may wish, for political reasons, to limit the number of patents issued; and hence some respective patent offices are not given sufficient resources by their respective governments to meet the demands placed on them by patent applicants. Even a supra-national patent office may be subject to political pressures from member governments to limit operations or limit spending on the examination of patents.
Political constraints -low threshold for quality
Some national governments may wish, for political reasons, to maximize the number of patents issued to local (national) applicants and hence may want to maintain low quality thresholds in the examination process (and, hence, may limit the amount of resources available for the examination process accordingly).
Political constraints -high threshold for quality
Some national governments may wish, for political reasons, to minimize the number of patents issued and may see imposing high thresholds in the examination process (i.e., "raising the bar") as a vehicle for minimizing the volume of issued patents.
Limiting the amount of resources available for the examination process may also, ironically, be a useful way of minimizing the volume of issued patents.
High growth rate in level of application for patents
The rapid growth in patent applications submitted to the world's major patent offices, including those from China and various developing countries in the wake of their accession to the WTO, creates a momentum of pressure on the examiner corps that is simply overwhelming and which is impossible to accommodate, no matter how much money is allocated to the patent offices.
Explosion of prior art
The cost of conducting comprehensive prior art searches, and of analyzing the results of those searches, is ballooning, due to an explosion in the volume of published technical knowledge, the increasing accessibility of technical knowledge across national and language barriers, and the growth of non-published but publiclypracticed inventions that need to be included as part of prior art. This generates a huge increase in the amount of time and effort that must be devoted to the examination of each patent -an increase that goes beyond a level that is politically or organizationally easy for those responsible for patent offices to recognize or accommodate.
High number of "inappropriate" patent applications
Some governments may wish to limit the capacity of patent offices to examine more patents out of a belief that there are too many-maybe millions too many-patent applications being filed that are not "appropriate." Such an opinion may be held regardless of whether what is an "appropriate" level may be defined.
Phase Two: Identify Alternative Potential Solutions to the Problems of Backlog and Unreliable Examination Quality in the Global Patent System
The following list constitutes an attempt to lay out the full range of salient and plausible solutions to the problems in a conceptually simple and non-redundant manner, based on a preliminary assessment of the pertinent literature and on basic professional and academic knowledge of the field. As was explained above in relation to the list of salient and plausible explanations for the problems, the categorization and description of these proposed solutions may be altered or re-arranged, based upon the results of detailed research during the full-scale implementation of the project of which this paper is the first result. In any case, during the full-scale implementation of the project these solutions will be more fully elaborated, justified and explained.
International cooperation solution
Enhanced cooperation between the world's major patent offices, to reduce redundancy in operations, to harmonize patent standards and to share patent examination work.
Private-sector outsourcing solution
Outsourcing of patent examination work to private organizations.
Public-sector outsourcing solution
Outsourcing of patent examination work to other patent offices.
Public-sector certification solution
Modified PCT process whereby a standardized "opinion" (i.e., certification) would be issued by WIPO containing a rating of the quality and strength of a patent application, in addition to the normal PCT search report.
Independent non-government certification solution
Establishment of an independent international patent certification organization, analogous to the International Standards Organization (ISO), that would issue standardized ratings of the quality and strength of patents and patent applications.
Private-sector certification solution
Establishment of a private international patent certification service that would issue standardized ratings of the quality and strength of patents and patent applications.
International quasi-patent solution
Modified PCT process whereby a "quasi patent" would be issued by WIPO (similar to an actual patent, but without the formal standing of a national patent), based on globally standardized examination criteria. This would be analogous to the European Patent as currently issued by the EPO, before entering the national stage, but global rather than European in geographic scope.
Private-sector financial solution
Patent offices would charges fees from patent applicants and patentees that are sufficiently high to easily cover the total cost of developing and maintaining an adequate high-quality, efficient and timely patent-examination system.
Public-sector financial solution
National governments would allocate budgets to their respective national patent offices, and also to supra-national patent offices such as the EPO over which they have some influence, that are sufficiently large to easily cover the total cost of developing and maintaining an adequate high-quality, efficient and timely patentexamination system. 
Phase Three: Detailed Analysis of the Relationships Between the Problems and the Solutions

Analysis of Cogency of Explanations
Analyze each of the thirteen explanations of the problems to determine just how cogent each one is, in itself, and relative to the other explanations. The results of this cogency analysis should be expressed as a score for each individual explanation (negligible, low, medium, high). The first vertical column in the table is intended for this purpose.
Analysis of Political and Practical Viability of Solutions
Analyze each of the nine alternative solutions to determine just how viable it is likely to be, taking into account political factors and other practical factors. This assessment of political and practical viability, or feasibility, should disregard the operational or logical appeal of each option as a "rational" solution to the problems. The results of this viability analysis should be expressed as a score for each individual solution (negligible, low, medium, high). The first horizontal row in the table is intended for this purpose.
Analysis of the Probability of Solutions Actually Addressing the Problems as Explained
Analyze each solution to determine the probability that it will adequately address the problems as characterized in each respective explanation. The results of this probability analysis should be expressed as a score for each individual solution (negligible, low, medium, high). Each individual cell in the matrix (consisting of a total of 117 cells) is intended for this purpose. The type of thinking required here is to ask for each solution, "How likely is it that this solution will actually solve the twinproblems of patent-backlog and patent-quality, on the assumption that the respective explanation provides a credible description of the causes of the problems?" In other words, for this analytical exercise it is inappropriate to think about whether or not the explanation really is cogent; rather, on the assumption that it is cogent, it is necessary to judge the likelihood that the respective solution will successfully address the problems as characterized by each respective explanation.
An illustration of the results of the above three analytical steps is provided in Table 2 . These results were produced by the current author based on a preliminary assessment of the pertinent literature and on general professional and academic knowledge. During the fullscale implementation of the project each one of the scores would be justified on the basis of systematic and substantive research.
Assign Quantitative Weights for the Qualitative Scores in the Table
In order to make the analysis robust and objective it is necessary to assign a quantitative score (or weight) to each qualitative score used in the explanations/solutions table. In the spreadsheet developed for this purpose by the current author the following weights were assigned: negligible = 1, low = 2, medium = 3, high = 4. Thus, each cross, tick or combination of ticks scored in the table would be automatically converted by the spreadsheet in to a number, based on the assigned weights (which could be varied according to analytical requirements or professional judgment, as needed). There is no table containing these transformed scores provided here, but the results would be identical in form and meaning to those portrayed in Table 2 .
Calculate the Weighted Probability of Success of Each Solution in Relation to Each Explanation
The score for each cell in the matrix, obtained using the procedure just described (in step #4), can then be multiplied by the weighted scores for the cogency of the explanations (obtained from steps #1 and #4) and also multiplied by the weighted scores for the political and practical viability of the solutions (obtained from steps #2
and #4). The resulting number in each cell of the matrix will represent the probability that each solution will adequately address the problems as characterized in each explanation, taking in to account the cogency of the respective explanation and the political and practical viability of the solution. The results of this exercise are portrayed in Table 3 . These results are calculated automatically by the author's spreadsheets developed for this purpose (hereinafter just called the "spreadsheets"). In short, Table 3 weights the results of the rational scoring exercise summarized in Table   2 to adjust for the problem that some explanations that are salient in the literature and policy debates might not be very cogent and that some solutions might not be very feasible, due to political or other practical constraints.
Phase Four: Review the Results of Systematically Analyzing the Relationships Between the Explanations of the Problems and Alternative Solutions
The results of the above calculations may be expressed graphically, as illustrated by The notable insight that is produced by the results in Figure 2 is that when political and other practical constraints are explicitly analyzed, in a step-by-step systematic manner, using quantitative scoring techniques, the three "certification" solutions, together with the private-sector financial solution, rise in relative importance. This insight is of course subject to the same caveats that apply to interpretation of the results in Figure 1 . Nevertheless, we can see from this simple exercise how adopting the approach advocated here may lead to quite productive, and sometimes surprising, outcomes in analyzing potential alternative solutions to the problems.
Phase Five: Detailed Analysis of the Relationships Between the Alternative Solutions
If we take seriously the basic principles enunciated earlier then it follows that we will need to think carefully about the interaction effects and dependency relationships of the various solutions. A viable strategy to solve the problems will need to incorporate the results of that thinking. The practical and simple methodology recommended here for pursuing that goal will involve three steps, as follows: Table 4 illustrates how the array of solutions can be mapped against itself to facilitate identification of the strategic relationships between the solutions.
Create a Matrix to Map the Interactions of the Alternative Solutions
Analyze the Dependency Relationships of the Solutions
The next step is to consider each of the nine solutions individually and to ask to what degree its successful implementation will depend upon the adoption of each of the other solutions. The product of this analysis should be expressed as a score for each individual relationship (negligible, low, medium, high), for a total of 72 cells in the matrix. The results of this exercise conducted by the current author-based on a preliminary assessment of the pertinent literature and on general professional and academic knowledge-are presented in Table 5 . During the full-scale implementation of the project each one of the scores would be justified on the basis of systematic and substantive research (the same situation that applies to the scores in Table 2 ).
Assign Quantitative Weights for the Qualitative Scores in the Table
In order to make the dependency analysis quantitative and objective rather than just systematic it is necessary to assign a quantitative score (or weight) to each qualitative score used in the matrix. In the spreadsheet developed for this purpose by the current author the following weights were assigned: negligible = 0, low = 1, medium = 3, high = 10. Thus, each cross, tick or combination of ticks scored in the table would be automatically converted by the spreadsheet in to a number, based on the assigned weights (which could be varied according to analytical requirements or professional judgment, as needed). The results of this exercise are reproduced in Table 6 . The number in each cell is an index of the degree to which the successful implementation of the solution listed at the top of its column would depend upon the adoption of the respective solution listed at the left of its row. The number in the cell at the end of each row (i.e., the horizontal total of the scores) is an indicator of the degree of influence that particular solution has on the likelihood of success of all of the other solutions combined (this can be called an "inter-strategy influence index"). The number in the cell at the bottom of each column is an indicator of the degree to which the likelihood of success of that particular solution is dependent upon all of the other solutions combined.
Phase Six: Development of Strategy Concepts Based on Analysis of Relationships Between Explanations and Solutions and on Analysis of Dependencies Between the Alternative Solutions
By juxtaposing the results of the analyses summarized in Figure 2 and Table 6 we are able to produce Table 7 , which portrays three quantitative ratings of each alternative proposed solution to the twin problems of backlog and unreliable examination quality in the patent system: an Intrinsic Problem-solving Power Index, an Inter-strategy Influence Index, and an Inter-strategy Dependency Index. The numbers in Table 7 can then be graphed as shown in Figure 3 to illustrate the likely strategic relationships between the alternative solutions to the problems. These results can be produced automatically on a spreadsheet, based entirely on the scores entered in to Table 1 (shown on Table 2 ) and in to Table 4 (shown on Table 5 ).
In Figure 3 , the size of the bubble corresponding to each solution represents an index of the estimated relative power of that solution to address the underlying twin problems of backlog and unreliable examination quality in the global patent system (i.e., the Intrinsic Problem-solving Power Index). The precise value of the index for each solution is indicated by the number in each bubble. The position of each bubble on the vertical axis represents the degree to which the respective solution is dependent upon the prior implementation of other solutions for its success (i.e., the Inter-strategy Dependency Index). The position of each bubble on the horizontal axis represents the degree to which the respective solution may act as a precursor or precondition for implementation of solutions positioned high on the vertical axis (i.e., the Inter-strategy Influence Index). The figure portrays not so much an estimate of the feasibility of implementing each solution, given the requisite level of political will, etc., but rather an estimate of the feasibility of actually solving the underlying problems, taking in to account the strategic relationships of the alternative solutions.
Any conclusions we may draw from reviewing the information in Figure 3 must be covered by the same caveats we previously applied to our possible interpretation of Figures 1 and 2. Nevertheless, it is easy to see from the figure what a powerful tool the methodology described in the preceding pages may be for conceptualizing strategies to solve the patent problems discussed in this paper. By appropriately juxtaposing complementary solutions and taking in to account their dependency-upon or influence-upon each other, policy makers are more likely to be successful in their quest of solving the problems at hand than would otherwise be the case.
To illustrate how this tool might be applied, I will make a few simple and casual observations. Of the four solutions grouped together in Zone C as "dependent strategies," two of them (the public-sector outsourcing solution and the private-sector outsourcing solution)
are already practiced to some degree by some patent offices. Figure 3 tells us that no matter how well these two solutions might be implemented they are not likely to have a big impact on actually solving the underlying problems unless the solutions in Zone B are first of all implemented. In addition, Figure 3 also suggests that, when we take the size of the bubbles in to account, that dealing with the underlying financial constraints of the patent system (generating sufficient fees from users of the patent system and obtaining adequate budget allowances from government to cover the full cost of running an efficient and reliable service) may provide a very powerful stepping stone towards eventually implementing Zone C solutions. In addition, the very ambitious Zone C solution of implementing a world-wide patent system of some sort (once again, a solution that has already been touted by somealbeit cautiously-in the debates, as a grand master solution to the problems) will most likely only work after all of the other solutions have first of all been put in place. In other words, it will only ever be a prize for completing the strategic journey rather than a key to success in making the journey. In addition, the "wild card" certification solutions in Zone A (which, incidentally, have so far been mostly ignored in the literature and the debates) are intriguing in that while they may exert only modest leverage on other strategies they are potentially very powerful in effectively addressing the problems directly while simultaneously also being largely independent of other strategies.
There is insufficient space here to further interpret Figure 3 or to elaborate upon any of the strategy concepts. That will have to wait until implementation of the full-scale research project. The most important thing to observe at this stage is that the methodology outlined in this paper may produce some very simple but powerful analytical tools to help policy makers and legislators plot viable strategies for solving the twin problems of the global backlog in processing patent applications and the unreliable quality in the examination processes and decision-making of patent offices regarding the granting of patents. Figure 3 also illustrates how adopting a systematic and rigorous analytical process, employing quantitative techniques for scoring and presenting results from the assessment exercise, may lead to insights that may sometimes be counterintuitive.
Comments on Data Collection for the Full-Scale Research Project
There are two alternative methods by which data may be assembled during the implementation of the full-scale research project. Both methods lead to the same practical end, namely, the entry of scores in to Table 1 (as illustrated by the example in Table 2 ) and in to Table 4 (as illustrated by the example in Table 5 ).
The first method requires the principle researcher to conduct detailed research (incorporating the collection of empirical data, the review of official documents and reports, the review of pertinent academic sources, and the systematic consideration of various practical and theoretical arguments, as appropriate) relevant to the subject matter of each and every cell in each table, namely139 cells for Table 1 (139 = 117 + 13 + 9) and 72 cells for Table 4 . A score corresponding to one of the four codes indicated (negligible, low, medium, high) would be entered by the researcher in to each cell, with each score being justified individually and analytically by the detailed research conducted for each cell. We could call this first method the "detailed substantive research" approach.
The second method, which we might call the "modified Delphi technique" approach, The modified Delphi technique approach could be implemented in either of two ways.
First, the table-scoring and the feed-back and discussion exercises could be administered at a distance by email, web-based scoring or old-fashioned correspondence, with some kind of multi-media communications (e.g., video-conferencing) being used to facilitate the discussion phase of each exercise. Alternatively, a one-day workshop of all panel members could be conducted in person, involving face to face discussion, and multiple iterations of the scoring / aggregation / discussion process as appropriate. Which of the two options would be appropriate would depend primarily on the level of funding available for the project.
The two approaches-the detailed substantive research approach and the modified Delphi technique approach-are complementary methods. The detailed substantive research approach can be employed usefully to prepare background information to aid discussions that take place within the modified Delphi technique approach and to ensure that the categories employed in the two tables are optimal. In addition, the background research conducted as part of the detailed substantive research exercise may be used to help interpret the results of the modified Delphi technique exercise.
The two alternative methods will arguably be best employed as complementary methods as part of one larger project. If it turned out, however, that there were funding or other constraints that limited the scope of the research activity, then the either one of the two methods could be implemented alone.
Tables and Figures
The following tables and figures are all drawn from a spreadsheet software tool developed by the current author (Dr. Kelvin Willoughby) to automatically carry out the analysis described in this paper. High number of "inappropriate" patent applications ! = "Negligible" " = "Low" "" = "Medium" """ = "High" 
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